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About MCP Sentinel / Evidence before trust

A clearer picture
of the tools you trust.

MCP Sentinel connects server identities, security findings, runtime observations, and assessment history. It helps you inspect the evidence behind a deployment decision.

What ran, what was observed, and what remains unresolved belong in the same picture.

The product's purpose

Tool access deserves a closer look.

MCP servers connect agents to files, databases, APIs, and code execution. A useful security assessment needs to explain both the risks it found and the limits of what it could examine.

The registry makes findings discoverable. Research surfaces examine how capabilities combine. Reports connect those conclusions to evidence, coverage, and assessment history, so a decision can be inspected rather than reduced to a badge.

One product. Several ways to see.

01 / Discover

The registry

Find server identities and inspect the findings, assessment method, coverage, and history already on file.

Listed does not mean completely assessed.

Browse server reports
02 / Connect

Cross-server research

Explore capability combinations and multi-step patterns with the nature of their supporting evidence clearly labelled.

Observed, inferred, and hypothetical remain distinct.

Explore the connections
03 / Inspect

Reports & verification

Place findings in a framework context and review the available signed assessment reports alongside their scope and limitations.

A signature protects a record; it is not a safety guarantee.

Explore assessment reports

From identity to assessment

How an assessment is assembled

Four layers of the assessment pipeline, summarized here. Source acquisition, sandbox execution, and cross-server analysis each have their own boundaries. The deterministic rule engine judges the available evidence; the report retains what was not observed.

Stage 01
Discovery
@mcp-sentinel/crawler

Discovers server identities from package registries, repository sources, and MCP registries. Records the discovery source and errors; a listing alone is not a completed assessment.

Stage 02
Connection
@mcp-sentinel/connector

Acquires an artifact or connects through the MCP SDK for read-only enumeration. Live third-party endpoints are never used for tool invocation. A fetched artifact may be exercised only inside a sandbox that passes the execution boundary checks.

Stage 03
Analysis
@mcp-sentinel/analyzer

Evaluates the 184 detection rules against the available source, declarations, dependencies, protocol metadata, and eligible runtime observations. Each finding carries evidence and remediation. Coverage records the inputs and execution gaps.

Stage 04
Verdict
@mcp-sentinel/scorer

deriveVerdict() turns the findings and the coverage ledger into one of four verdicts. Risk: any critical finding, or a lethal trifecta. Caution: any high finding. Safe: no critical or high finding AND coverage sufficient for that verdict. Otherwise Insufficient coverage - never Safe by default.

184 detection rules across 21 categories

Every rule is a typed TypeScript implementation with a mandatory evidence chain. The engine is deterministic. Every finding requires rule_id, evidence, and remediation. Categories A-K are detailed below; the full A-U catalogue is on the taxonomy page.

A

Description Analysis

9 rules

Requires: Tool metadata

Unicode homoglyph attacks, zero-width character injection, base64-encoded payloads hidden from human review

A1Prompt Injection in Description
A2Excessive Scope Claims
A3Suspicious URLs
A4Cross-Server Tool Name Shadowing
A5Description Length Anomaly
A6Unicode Homoglyph Attack
A7Zero-Width Character Injection
A8Description-Capability Mismatch
A9Encoded Instructions in Description
B

Schema Analysis

7 rules

Requires: Tool metadata

Parameter-level injection surface, dangerous defaults (recursive:true, disable_ssl_verify:true), unconstrained additional properties

B1Missing Input Validation
B2Dangerous Parameter Types
B3Excessive Parameter Count
B4Schema-less Tools
B5Prompt Injection in Parameter Description
B6Unconstrained Additional Properties
B7Dangerous Default Parameter Values
C

Code Analysis

17 rules

Requires: Source code

20+ secret token formats, prototype pollution, unsafe deserialization, JWT algorithm confusion, timing attacks on secret comparison

C1Command Injection
C2Path Traversal
C3SSRF
C4SQL Injection
C5Hardcoded Secrets (20+ formats)
C6Error Leakage
C7Wildcard CORS
C8No Auth on Network Interface
C9Excessive Filesystem Scope
C10Prototype Pollution
C11ReDoS Vulnerability
C12Unsafe Deserialization
C13Server-Side Template Injection
C14JWT Algorithm Confusion
C15Timing Attack on Secret Comparison
C16Dynamic Code Evaluation
C17Tool-Schema-vs-Handler-Consumption Differential
D

Dependency Analysis

7 rules

Requires: package.json / requirements.txt

50+ confirmed malicious package names including MCP ecosystem typosquats, Levenshtein distance for typosquat detection, dependency confusion (high version number trick)

D1Known CVEs in Dependencies
D2Abandoned Dependencies
D3Typosquatting Risk
D4Excessive Dependency Count
D5Known Malicious Packages
D6Weak Cryptography Dependencies
D7Dependency Confusion Attack Risk
E

Behavioral Analysis

7 rules

Requires: Connection metadata

Live connection checks - transport security, authentication presence, response time anomalies, tool count explosion - plus what the sandbox observatory witnessed a tool actually do versus what it declared

E1No Authentication Required
E2Insecure Transport (HTTP/WS)
E3Response Time Anomaly (>10s)
E4Excessive Tool Count (>50)
E5Observed Declared-vs-Observed Behavior Divergence
E6Observed Cross-Server Toxic Flow
E7Observed Intra-Session Behavior Drift
F

Ecosystem Context

8 rules

Requires: Tool metadata

Lethal Trifecta (private data + untrusted input + external comms = a Risk verdict), circular data loop enabling persistent injection, multi-step exfiltration chain

F1Lethal Trifecta
F2High-Risk Capability Profile
F3Data Flow Risk Source→Sink
F4MCP Spec Non-Compliance
F5Official Namespace Squatting
F6Circular Data Loop
F7Multi-Step Exfiltration Chain
F8Cross-Tool Invocation-Override Injection
G

Adversarial AI

7 rules

Requires: Tool metadata + scan history

Attacks that only work because the target is an AI - indirect injection gateways, trust assertion injection, tool behavior drift (rug pull), DNS data exfiltration

G1Indirect Prompt Injection Gateway
G2Trust Assertion Injection
G3Tool Response Format Injection
G4Context Window Saturation
G5Capability Escalation via Prior Approval
G6Rug Pull / Tool Behavior Drift
G7DNS-Based Data Exfiltration Channel
H

2026 Attack Surface

3 rules

Requires: Mixed

March 2026 additions: OAuth 2.0 MCP auth flaws, injection into MCP initialize response fields (processed before tool descriptions), cross-agent propagation in multi-agent orchestration

H1MCP OAuth 2.0 Insecure Implementation
H2Prompt Injection in Initialize Response
H3Multi-Agent Propagation Risk
I

Protocol Surface

17 rules

Requires: Protocol metadata + annotations

MCP protocol primitive attacks: annotation deception (readOnlyHint lies), sampling abuse (23-41% attack amplification), cross-config lethal trifecta, consent fatigue exploitation (84.2% success rate), credential harvesting via elicitation

I1Annotation Deception
I2Missing Destructive Annotation
I3Resource Metadata Injection
I4Dangerous Resource URI
I5Resource-Tool Shadowing
I6Prompt Template Injection
I7Sampling Capability Abuse
I8Sampling Cost Attack
I9Elicitation Credential Harvesting
I10Elicitation URL Redirect
I11Over-Privileged Root
I12Capability Escalation Post-Init
I13Cross-Config Lethal Trifecta
I15Transport Session Security
I16Consent Fatigue Exploitation
I17Extension-Gated Capability Grant Without Vetting
I18Unbounded Resource URI Template
J

2026 Threat Intelligence

9 rules

Requires: Source code + tool metadata

CVE-backed rules from real-world incidents: cross-agent config poisoning (CVE-2025-53773), git argument injection (CVE-2025-68143), full schema poisoning (CyberArk FSP), health endpoint disclosure (CVE-2026-29787), tool output poisoning (CyberArk ATPA), OpenAPI spec injection (CVE-2026-22785)

J1Cross-Agent Config Poisoning
J2Git Argument Injection
J3Full Schema Poisoning
J4Health Endpoint Disclosure
J5Tool Output Poisoning
J6Tool Preference Manipulation
J7OpenAPI Spec Injection
J8Untrusted Peer-Response to OS Command
J9Runtime-Mutable Tool Surface
K

Compliance & Governance

20 rules

Requires: Source code

Framework-mapped rules closing gaps across ISO 27001, ISO 42001, EU AI Act, NIST AI RMF, CoSAI, MAESTRO - audit trail integrity, human oversight, credential lifecycle, supply chain hooks, sandbox enforcement

K1Absent Structured Logging
K2Audit Trail Destruction
K3Audit Log Tampering
K4Missing Human Confirmation
K5Auto-Approve Bypass
K6Overly Broad OAuth Scopes
K7Long-Lived Tokens
K8Cross-Boundary Credential Sharing
K9Dangerous Post-Install Hooks
K10Package Registry Substitution
K11Missing Server Integrity Verification
K12Executable Content in Response
K13Unsanitized Tool Output
K14Agent Credential Propagation
K15Multi-Agent Collusion Preconditions
K16Unbounded Recursion
K17Missing Timeout or Circuit Breaker
K18Cross-Trust-Boundary Data Flow
K19Missing Runtime Sandbox Enforcement
K20Insufficient Audit Context in Logging

OWASP MCP Top 10 mapping

These selected rule mappings provide an orientation to the OWASP MCP Top 10. A server's posture shows whether findings were detected in each category; an empty category is meaningful only alongside its coverage. The full active catalogue is available on the taxonomy page.

IDCategoryRules
MCP01Prompt InjectionA1, A5, A7, A8, A9, B5, F1, F6, G1, G2, G3, H2, I3, I6, I7, J3, J5, J6
MCP02Tool PoisoningA2, A4, A6, F2, F5, G5, I1, I2, J5, J6, K12, K13
MCP03Command InjectionC1, C9, C13, C16, J2, J7
MCP04Data ExfiltrationA3, F1, F3, F7, G7, I9, I13, K18
MCP05Privilege EscalationC2, C8, C10, C12, H1, I4, I12, J1, K6, K8, K14
MCP06Excessive PermissionsA2, B3, B7, E4, F2, I11, I16, K6
MCP07Insecure ConfigurationB6, C7, C8, C11, C14, C15, D6, E1, E2, H1, I15, J4, K7, K17, K19
MCP08Dependency VulnerabilitiesD1, D2, D3, D4, D5, D6, D7, K9, K10
MCP09Logging & MonitoringC6, E3, K1, K2, K3, K20
MCP10Supply ChainD3, D5, D7, A4, F5, G6, I5, J7, K9, K10, K11

The verdict

How it is derived

Risk           any critical finding,
               or a lethal trifecta (F1 / I13)

Caution        otherwise, any high finding

Safe           no critical or high finding
               AND coverage sufficient for that verdict

Insufficient   no critical or high finding,
coverage       but too little was checked
               to call it safe

Never Safe by default.

What it means

Lethal Trifecta (F1 / I13)

If a server reads private data AND ingests untrusted content AND has external network access — or a client config spreads those three across servers — the verdict is Risk regardless of other findings. No amount of clean code compensates for this combination.

The coverage gate

Findings are positive evidence: a supported critical finding is Risk at any coverage. The absence of findings is not. A clean result is Safe only when the coverage band is high or medium and no high or critical rule was left with an unanswered input — otherwise it is Insufficient coverage. Refused, out-of-scope and not-observed are never “clean”.

What stays numeric

Per-finding confidence, per-framework compliance percentages and the attack-graph exploitability score (0–1) are separate signals and remain. There is no composite number to fold them into.

Architecture principles

Rules are typed implementations

All 184 detection rules are TypeScript TypedRuleV2 implementations registered in a central registry - metadata in the registry, detection in code, no YAML. Adding a rule never requires changing engine code.

Deterministic rule decisions

The detection engine uses typed rules, AST analysis, capability graphs, entropy, structural parsing, and vulnerability lookup. Scoped assisted framework and observation workflows do not replace its evidence requirements.

Collect everything, judge later

Crawlers store all raw metadata. Analysis is a separate pass. We never discard data because we don't have a rule for it yet.

History by default

Every scan result is immutable. Verdicts and findings change over time; the history table tracks every change. Trends are first-class.

Execution has a boundary

Live third-party endpoints receive read-only enumeration. Runtime checks may exercise our fetched copy of an artifact only after the sandbox verifies denied network egress and filesystem confinement. Refused or failed execution remains a gap.

Evidence required

Every finding must include rule_id, evidence (what triggered it), and remediation (how to fix it). Findings without evidence are useless.

02 / Preserve the record

An assessment has a scope.
Its record should carry it.

The registry keeps recorded findings and assessment history. Reports carry those findings with their method and coverage, so the evidence remains attached to the conclusion.

Signed report availability depends on the deployment's signing configuration. Failed checks and missing observations remain questions to resolve.

A signature protects the report under its signing scheme; it does not guarantee a server's safety.

Explore report integrity

The principle we return to

Make the evidence inspectable.

A failed check is not a clean result. An inferred path is not a witnessed attack. A report is strongest when its findings and its unanswered questions can both be examined.

Explore the registry