ADR Analysis

Analyzes Architecture Decision Records (ADRs) to extract decision context, validate against best practices, and identify architectural patterns for maintaining documentation quality and tracking technical debt evolution.

tosin2013ai-mlTypeScript
0Tools
16Findings
22Stars
Mar 22, 2026Last Scanned
5 critical · 9 high · 1 medium · 1 low findings detected

Security Category Deep Dive

Prompt Injection
Prompt & context manipulation attacks
69
Maturity
14
Rules
5
Sub-Categories
1
Gaps
64%
Implemented
56
Tests
1
Stories
PI-DIRDirect Input Injection
100%3 rules
Injection via tool descriptions and parameter fields
GAP-001Prompt Injection Coverage GapMissing detection coverage for emerging prompt injection attack variants not addressed by current rules
PI-INDIndirect / Gateway Injection
100%4 rules
Hidden instructions via external content and tool responses
PI-CTXContext Manipulation
100%2 rules
Context window saturation and prior-approval exploitation
PI-ENCEncoding & Obfuscation
100%3 rules
Payload hiding via invisible chars, base64, schema fields
PI-TPLTemplate & Output Poisoning
100%2 rules
Injection via prompt templates and runtime tool output
Framework Coverage
OWASP MCP Top 1014/14
MITRE ATLAS14/14
CoSAI MCP2/14
OWASP Agentic Top 1012/14
Kill Chain Phases
0Initial Access
0Defense Evasion
0Execution
0Persistence

Findings16

5critical
9high
1medium
1low

Critical5

criticalC1Command InjectionMCP03-command-injectionAML.T0054
Pattern "`[^`]+`" matched in source_code: "`Project path validated: ${this.config.projectPath}`" (at position 6226)
Replace exec()/execSync() with execFile() and pass arguments as an array, never as a string. Validate all inputs against an allowlist before use in any shell context. For subprocess.run, always pass a list and shell=False.
criticalL7Transitive MCP Server DelegationMCP06-excessive-permissionsAML.T0054
Pattern "(?:new\s+Client|createClient|MCPClient|StdioClientTransport|SSEClientTransport|StreamableHTTPClientTransport).*(?:server|handler|tool)" matched in source_code: "mcpClient.listTool" (at position 7526)
MCP servers MUST NOT create client connections to other MCP servers without explicit user disclosure. If delegation is required, declare all downstream servers in the server's capabilities and tool descriptions. Never forward user credentials to sub-servers. Implement a trust boundary between the approved server and any delegated servers. Log all transitive delegations for audit.
criticalQ11Code Suggestion Poisoning via MCPMCP01-prompt-injectionAML.T0054.001
Pattern "(?:suggest|generate|complete|insert).*(?:code|function|class|import|require)" matched in source_code: "GenerateArchitecturalKnowledgeFunction" (at position 2381)
MCP tool outputs flowing into IDE code suggestion contexts must be sanitized. Implement output content policies that: (1) strip hidden Unicode characters (zero-width, RTL override, tag characters), (2) detect embedded instructions targeting AI code assistants, (3) validate code blocks against security patterns before they enter the suggestion pipeline, (4) never include shell commands in tool outputs without explicit [COMMAND] markers visible to the user. Reference: IDEsaster (Dec 2025), arXiv 2509.22040.
criticalQ13MCP Bridge Package Supply Chain AttackMCP10-supply-chainAML.T0054
Pattern "(?:mcp|fastmcp|langchain-mcp|llama-index-mcp)(?:>=|~=|==)?(?!\d)" matched in source_code: "MCP" (at position 59)
MCP bridge packages (mcp-remote, mcp-proxy, @modelcontextprotocol/sdk, fastmcp) are high-value supply chain targets — CVE-2025-6514 (CVSS 9.6) in mcp-remote affected 437,000+ installs. Always pin exact versions (no ^ or ~ ranges). Use lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, uv.lock). Never run `npx mcp-remote` without version pinning. Verify package integrity with `npm audit` or `pip-audit` before deployment. Reference: CVE-2025-6514, OWASP ASI04.
criticalQ9Agentic Workflow DAG ManipulationMCP05-privilege-escalationAML.T0058
Pattern "(?:next[_\s]?(?:step|node|agent)|route[_\s]?to|redirect[_\s]?to|skip[_\s]?(?:step|node|validation))" matched in source_code: "next step" (at position 32079)
MCP tools must NOT modify agentic workflow graphs, execution order, or routing during runtime. Workflow structure should be immutable once execution begins. If dynamic workflow modification is required, implement: (1) approval gates that require human confirmation before graph mutations, (2) integrity checks that validate the workflow graph against a known-good baseline after each step, (3) audit logging of all graph modifications with rollback capability. Reference: arXiv 2602.19555, Trend Micro subgraph impersonation attack (2026).

High9

highK1Absent Structured LoggingMCP09-logging-monitoringAML.T0054
Pattern "console\.(log|warn|error)\s*\(.*(?:tool|request|handler|execute|invoke)" matched in source_code: "console.log(tools.tools.length); // 20+ available tool" (at position 7556)
Implement structured logging (pino, winston, or equivalent) for all tool call handlers. Every tool invocation should log: timestamp, tool name, caller identity, parameters (sanitized), result status, and duration. Required by ISO 27001 A.8.15, CoSAI MCP-T12, and NIST AI RMF MEASURE 2.6.
highK16Unbounded Recursion / Missing Depth LimitsMCP07-insecure-configAML.T0054
Pattern "(invoke|call|execute)[_\s-]?(?:tool|agent|self)(?!.*(?:depth|level|limit|max[_\s-]?(?:depth|recursi|iter|call)|count))" matched in source_code: "CallTool" (at position 438)
Add explicit depth/recursion limits to all recursive operations. Use iterative approaches where possible. Set maximum depth for directory walking (max_depth=10), tree traversal (max_level=20), and agent re-invocation (max_calls=5). Implement circuit breakers that halt after N iterations. Required by EU AI Act Art. 15 (robustness) and OWASP ASI08.
highD1Known CVEs in DependenciesMCP08-dependency-vuln
Dependency "ajv@8.17.1" has known CVEs:
Update dependencies to versions that patch known CVEs. Run 'npm audit fix' or 'pip-audit' to identify and resolve vulnerable dependencies.
highK13Unsanitized Tool OutputMCP02-tool-poisoningAML.T0054
Pattern "(?:query|execute|select|find).*(?:return|respond|result|rows|data)(?!.*(?:sanitize|escape|encode|map|filter|select|pick))" matched in source_code: "execute commands internally - instead, it tells YOU what commands to run and processes the result" (at position 31697)
Sanitize all external data before including in tool responses. Implement output encoding that neutralizes prompt injection patterns. Truncate excessively long content. Validate structure before passing database results. Apply the principle: treat all external data as untrusted, even in tool outputs. Required by CoSAI MCP-T4.
highK18Cross-Trust-Boundary Data Flow in Tool ResponseMCP04-data-exfiltrationAML.T0054
Pattern "(?:readFile|read_file|query|select|getSecret|getCredential|getPassword).*(?:webhook|http|fetch|axios|post|send|email|slack|discord)" matched in source_code: "query the base code repository (e.g., https://github.com/validatedpatterns/common for OpenShift) and authoritative pattern documentation (e.g., http" (at position 29500)
Implement data flow taint tracking: tag data from sensitive sources (databases, credentials, files) and prevent it from flowing to external sinks (HTTP, webhooks, email) without explicit sanitization/redaction. Apply data classification and enforce boundary controls per trust level. Required by ISO 27001 A.5.14 and CoSAI MCP-T5.
highK19Missing Runtime Sandbox EnforcementMCP07-insecure-configAML.T0054
Pattern "(run[_\s-]?as[_\s-]?root|EUID.*0|uid.*0)(?!.*(?:drop|setuid|seteuid|change.?user))" matched in source_code: "UIDED EXECUTION MODE**: This tool guides you through an interactive, step-by-step deployment validation workflow. It does NOT execute commands internally - instead, it tells YOU what commands to run and processes the results iteratively. **Workflow**: (1) First call with iteration=0" (at position 31571)
Run MCP servers in sandboxed containers with: (1) No --privileged flag, (2) Minimal Linux capabilities (drop ALL, add only needed), (3) Read-only root filesystem, (4) Non-root user, (5) Seccomp/AppArmor profiles enabled, (6) No host mounts except data volumes. CoSAI warns containers alone are insufficient — add seccomp profiles. Required by CoSAI MCP-T8 and ISO 27001 A.8.22.
highQ14Concurrent MCP Server Race ConditionMCP07-insecure-configT1068
Pattern "(?:read|write|modify|delete).*(?:file|path|directory)(?!.*(?:lock|mutex|semaphore|flock|atomic))" matched in source_code: "readFile" (at position 678)
MCP servers sharing filesystem or database backends with other servers must implement proper concurrency controls. Use: (1) file locking (flock/lockfile) for filesystem operations, (2) database transactions for all read-modify-write sequences, (3) atomic file operations (O_EXCL, mkdtemp) instead of check-then-create, (4) lstat() to detect symlinks before following (CVE-2025-53109). Never assume exclusive access to shared resources — other MCP servers may be operating concurrently.
highO6Server Fingerprinting via Error ResponsesMCP04-data-exfiltrationAML.T0057
Pattern "(?:diagnostics?|debug|system_?info|server_?info|health_?detailed|status_?detail)\s*[:=]\s*\{[^}]*(?:version|os|arch|platform|uptime|memory|cpu|disk|hostname|pid)" matched in source_code: "SERVER_INFO = { name: 'mcp-adr-analysis-server', version: getPackageVersion(), description: 'MCP server for analyzing Architectural Decision Records and project arch" (at position 4295)
Never expose process, OS, runtime, or database metadata in tool responses or error messages. Use generic error messages ("An error occurred") for production responses. Remove or disable debug/diagnostic endpoints. If health endpoints are needed, limit them to simple "ok"/"error" status without infrastructure details. Wrap all error handlers with a sanitization layer that strips system information.
highD1Known CVEs in DependenciesMCP08-dependency-vuln
Dependency "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk@1.19.1" has known CVEs:
Update dependencies to versions that patch known CVEs. Run 'npm audit fix' or 'pip-audit' to identify and resolve vulnerable dependencies.

Medium1

mediumK17Missing Timeout or Circuit BreakerMCP07-insecure-configAML.T0054
Pattern "(?:query|execute|find|select|aggregate)\s*\((?!.*(?:timeout|maxTimeMS|statement_timeout|deadline|cancel))" matched in source_code: "find(" (at position 7688)
Add timeouts to ALL external calls: HTTP requests (30s), database queries (10s), subprocess execution (60s), and MCP tool calls (30s). Implement circuit breakers that open after N consecutive failures (e.g., opossum, cockatiel). Use AbortSignal for cancellable operations. Required by EU AI Act Art. 15 and OWASP ASI08.

Low1

lowF4MCP Spec Non-ComplianceMCP07-insecure-config
Server fails MCP spec compliance checks: required:server_name; required:server_version; required:protocol_version; recommended:tool_descriptions; recommended:parameter_descriptions
Follow the MCP specification for server metadata. Include server name, version, and protocol version. Provide descriptions for all tools and parameters.