n8n
Fair-code workflow automation platform with native AI capabilities. Combine visual building with custom code, self-host or cloud, 400+ integrations.
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Mar 19, 2026Last Scanned
Findings11
5critical
4high
1medium
1low
0informational
criticalC1Command InjectionMCP03-command-injectionAML.T0054
Pattern "`[^`]+`" matched in source_code: "`
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║ Cursor n8n MCP Server ║
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Usage:
cursor-n8n-mcp Start MCP server
cursor-n8n-mcp setup Interactive setup
cursor-n8n-mcp config Show configuration template
cursor-n8n-mcp help Show this help message
Environment Variables:
N8N_API_URL n8n instance URL (required)
N8N_API_KEY n8n API key (required)
LOG_LEVEL Log level (debug, info, warn, error)
`" (at position 370)
Replace exec()/execSync() with execFile() and pass arguments as an array, never as a string. Validate all inputs against an allowlist before use in any shell context. For subprocess.run, always pass a list and shell=False.
criticalJ1Cross-Agent Configuration PoisoningMCP05-privilege-escalationAML.T0054
Pattern "(\.cursor[/\\]|cursor[/\\]mcp\.json)" matched in source_code: ".cursor/" (at position 1316)
MCP servers MUST NOT write to AI agent configuration directories. If configuration management is the server's purpose, require explicit user confirmation before any write and restrict paths to the server's own config namespace. CVE-2025-53773 demonstrated this enables full RCE across agent boundaries.
criticalQ13MCP Bridge Package Supply Chain AttackMCP10-supply-chainAML.T0054
Pattern "["']@modelcontextprotocol/sdk["']\s*:\s*["'](?:\^|~|\*|latest)" matched in source_code: ""@modelcontextprotocol/sdk": "^" (at position 12731)
MCP bridge packages (mcp-remote, mcp-proxy, @modelcontextprotocol/sdk, fastmcp) are high-value supply chain targets — CVE-2025-6514 (CVSS 9.6) in mcp-remote affected 437,000+ installs. Always pin exact versions (no ^ or ~ ranges). Use lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, uv.lock). Never run `npx mcp-remote` without version pinning. Verify package integrity with `npm audit` or `pip-audit` before deployment. Reference: CVE-2025-6514, OWASP ASI04.
criticalQ4IDE MCP Configuration InjectionMCP10-supply-chainAML.T0054
Pattern "(?:MCP|Mcp|mCp|mcP)\.(?:JSON|Json|jSon|jsoN)" matched in source_code: "mcp.json" (at position 1324)
MCP servers must NOT write to IDE configuration files (.cursor/mcp.json, .vscode/settings.json, .claude/settings.local.json) without explicit, interactive user confirmation that cannot be bypassed by repository-controlled settings. CVE-2025-54135/54136 (Cursor), CVE-2025-59536 (Claude Code) demonstrated that auto-start and silent config mutation enable RCE. Implement case-normalized path validation (CVE-2025-59944). Never use enableAllProjectMcpServers in shared repositories.
criticalQ9Agentic Workflow DAG ManipulationMCP05-privilege-escalationAML.T0058
Pattern "(?:next[_\s]?(?:step|node|agent)|route[_\s]?to|redirect[_\s]?to|skip[_\s]?(?:step|node|validation))" matched in source_code: "Next step" (at position 5014)
MCP tools must NOT modify agentic workflow graphs, execution order, or routing during runtime. Workflow structure should be immutable once execution begins. If dynamic workflow modification is required, implement: (1) approval gates that require human confirmation before graph mutations, (2) integrity checks that validate the workflow graph against a known-good baseline after each step, (3) audit logging of all graph modifications with rollback capability. Reference: arXiv 2602.19555, Trend Micro subgraph impersonation attack (2026).
highO10Privacy-Violating TelemetryMCP04-data-exfiltrationAML.T0057
Pattern "(?:os\.(?:type|release|platform|arch|hostname|cpus|networkInterfaces|userInfo|homedir)|process\.(?:arch|platform|ppid))\s*\(?" matched in source_code: "os.homedir(" (at position 3635)
Minimize data collection to only what is strictly necessary for tool functionality. Never collect OS fingerprints, hardware IDs, network interface details, or unique device identifiers without explicit user consent. Remove all tracking pixels, analytics beacons, and behavioral profiling code. If telemetry is needed, make it opt-in only, clearly documented, and limited to non-identifying aggregated metrics. Comply with GDPR data minimization (Art. 5(1)(c)) and EU AI Act transparency requirements (Art. 52).
highD1Known CVEs in DependenciesMCP08-dependency-vuln
Dependency "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk@1.20.1" has known CVEs:
Update dependencies to versions that patch known CVEs. Run 'npm audit fix' or 'pip-audit' to identify and resolve vulnerable dependencies.
highQ14Concurrent MCP Server Race ConditionMCP07-insecure-configT1068
Pattern "(?:read|write|modify|delete).*(?:file|path|directory)(?!.*(?:lock|mutex|semaphore|flock|atomic))" matched in source_code: "readFileSync(configPath" (at position 4023)
MCP servers sharing filesystem or database backends with other servers must implement proper concurrency controls. Use: (1) file locking (flock/lockfile) for filesystem operations, (2) database transactions for all read-modify-write sequences, (3) atomic file operations (O_EXCL, mkdtemp) instead of check-then-create, (4) lstat() to detect symlinks before following (CVE-2025-53109). Never assume exclusive access to shared resources — other MCP servers may be operating concurrently.
highK16Unbounded Recursion / Missing Depth LimitsMCP07-insecure-configAML.T0054
Pattern "(readdir|walk|glob|find).*(?:recursi|deep|nested)(?!.*(?:depth|level|limit|max))" matched in source_code: "globalDir, { recursi" (at position 3721)
Add explicit depth/recursion limits to all recursive operations. Use iterative approaches where possible. Set maximum depth for directory walking (max_depth=10), tree traversal (max_level=20), and agent re-invocation (max_calls=5). Implement circuit breakers that halt after N iterations. Required by EU AI Act Art. 15 (robustness) and OWASP ASI08.
mediumK20Insufficient Audit Context in LoggingMCP09-logging-monitoringAML.T0054
Pattern "logger\.(info|warn|error)\s*\(.*(?:tool|request|handle|invoke)(?!.*(?:requestId|correlationId|traceId|spanId|agent[_\s-]?id|user[_\s-]?id))" matched in source_code: "logger.error('Unhandle" (at position 5879)
Use structured logging that includes all five ISO 27001 A.8.15 fields: (1) WHO — agent/user identity, (2) WHAT — tool name and operation, (3) WHEN — ISO 8601 timestamp, (4) WHERE — server ID and correlation ID, (5) OUTCOME — success/failure and result summary. Replace console.log with structured loggers (pino, winston). Add correlation IDs for request tracing across multi-agent chains.
lowF4MCP Spec Non-ComplianceMCP07-insecure-config
Server fails MCP spec compliance checks: required:server_name; required:server_version; required:protocol_version; recommended:tool_descriptions; recommended:parameter_descriptions
Follow the MCP specification for server metadata. Include server name, version, and protocol version. Provide descriptions for all tools and parameters.
Tools
No tools exposed by this server.
Security Category Deep Dive
Sub-Category Tree · Remediation Roadmap · Attack Stories · Compliance Overlay · ATLAS Techniques · Maturity Model
Prompt Injection
Prompt & context manipulation attacks
69
Maturity
14
Rules
5
Sub-Categories
1
Gaps
64%
Implemented
56
Tests
1
Stories
100%3 rules
Injection via tool descriptions and parameter fields
GAP-001Prompt Injection Coverage GapMissing detection coverage for emerging prompt injection attack variants not addressed by current rules
100%4 rules
Hidden instructions via external content and tool responses
100%2 rules
Context window saturation and prior-approval exploitation
100%3 rules
Payload hiding via invisible chars, base64, schema fields
100%2 rules
Injection via prompt templates and runtime tool output