RuVector
RuVector is a High Performance, Real-Time, Self-Learning, Vector Graph Neural Network, and Database built in Rust.
0Tools
3Findings
3.6kStars
—Downloads
Mar 22, 2026Last Scanned
Findings3
2critical
0high
0medium
1low
0informational
criticalQ13MCP Bridge Package Supply Chain AttackMCP10-supply-chainAML.T0054
Pattern "(?:mcp|fastmcp|langchain-mcp|llama-index-mcp)(?:>=|~=|==)?(?!\d)" matched in source_code: "mcp" (at position 1172)
MCP bridge packages (mcp-remote, mcp-proxy, @modelcontextprotocol/sdk, fastmcp) are high-value supply chain targets — CVE-2025-6514 (CVSS 9.6) in mcp-remote affected 437,000+ installs. Always pin exact versions (no ^ or ~ ranges). Use lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, uv.lock). Never run `npx mcp-remote` without version pinning. Verify package integrity with `npm audit` or `pip-audit` before deployment. Reference: CVE-2025-6514, OWASP ASI04.
criticalQ6Agent Identity Impersonation via MCPMCP05-privilege-escalationAML.T0054
Pattern "(?:execute|run|perform).*(?:as|on[_\s]?behalf[_\s]?of|with[_\s]?privileges[_\s]?of).*(?:agent|role)" matched in source_code: "performance Rust-native vector database with Agent" (at position 100)
MCP tools in multi-agent systems must verify agent identity cryptographically — never accept agent_id/agent_role as plain string parameters. Use cryptographic attestation (signed tokens, mTLS certificates, or capability tokens) for inter-agent communication. Implement the principle of least privilege: each agent should only be able to claim its own identity. Reference: OWASP ASI03, arXiv 2602.19555.
lowF4MCP Spec Non-ComplianceMCP07-insecure-config
Server fails MCP spec compliance checks: required:server_name; required:server_version; required:protocol_version; recommended:tool_descriptions; recommended:parameter_descriptions
Follow the MCP specification for server metadata. Include server name, version, and protocol version. Provide descriptions for all tools and parameters.
Tools
No tools exposed by this server.
Security Category Deep Dive
Sub-Category Tree · Remediation Roadmap · Attack Stories · Compliance Overlay · ATLAS Techniques · Maturity Model
Prompt Injection
Prompt & context manipulation attacks
69
Maturity
14
Rules
5
Sub-Categories
1
Gaps
64%
Implemented
56
Tests
1
Stories
100%3 rules
Injection via tool descriptions and parameter fields
GAP-001Prompt Injection Coverage GapMissing detection coverage for emerging prompt injection attack variants not addressed by current rules
100%4 rules
Hidden instructions via external content and tool responses
100%2 rules
Context window saturation and prior-approval exploitation
100%3 rules
Payload hiding via invisible chars, base64, schema fields
100%2 rules
Injection via prompt templates and runtime tool output