Telegram Communicator
Enables real-time communication with Telegram users via bots, supporting asynchronous messaging and secure chat interactions.
0Tools
14Findings
43Stars
—Downloads
Mar 22, 2026Last Scanned
Findings14
5critical
6high
2medium
1low
0informational
criticalC1Command InjectionMCP03-command-injectionAML.T0054
Pattern "`[^`]+`" matched in source_code: "`Failed to send notification: ${error.message}`" (at position 3837)
Replace exec()/execSync() with execFile() and pass arguments as an array, never as a string. Validate all inputs against an allowlist before use in any shell context. For subprocess.run, always pass a list and shell=False.
criticalK14Agent Credential Propagation via Shared StateMCP05-privilege-escalationAML.T0054
Pattern "(process\.env|os\.environ|setenv|putenv).*(?:token|credential|api[_\s-]?key|secret|password)" matched in source_code: "process.env.TELEGRAM_TOKEN" (at position 318)
Never write credentials to shared agent state. Use credential vaults (HashiCorp Vault, AWS Secrets Manager) with per-agent scoped access. Implement OAuth token exchange (RFC 8693) for cross-agent authorization. Redact credentials from all agent outputs before writing to shared memory. Required by OWASP ASI03/ASI07 and MAESTRO L7.
criticalL7Transitive MCP Server DelegationMCP06-excessive-permissionsAML.T0054
Pattern "(?:connect|initialize).*(?:mcp|modelcontextprotocol).*(?:server|endpoint|url)" matched in source_code: "Initialize the bot and MCP server" (at position 15247)
MCP servers MUST NOT create client connections to other MCP servers without explicit user disclosure. If delegation is required, declare all downstream servers in the server's capabilities and tool descriptions. Never forward user credentials to sub-servers. Implement a trust boundary between the approved server and any delegated servers. Log all transitive delegations for audit.
criticalN11Protocol Version Downgrade AttackMCP07-insecure-configAML.T0054
Pattern "(?:protocolVersion|protocol_version)\s*[:=]\s*['"](?:2024-11-05|1\.0|0\.)['"]" matched in source_code: "protocolVersion: "2024-11-05"" (at position 8915)
Enforce a minimum protocol version during the initialize handshake. The 2024-11-05 spec lacks tool annotations, elicitation, and transport session security — downgrading to it strips safety features added in 2025-03-26 and 2025-06-18. Reject connections requesting protocol versions below your minimum supported version. Never echo back the client-requested version without validation.
criticalQ13MCP Bridge Package Supply Chain AttackMCP10-supply-chainAML.T0054
Pattern "(?:mcp|fastmcp|langchain-mcp|llama-index-mcp)(?:>=|~=|==)?(?!\d)" matched in source_code: "MCP" (at position 7535)
MCP bridge packages (mcp-remote, mcp-proxy, @modelcontextprotocol/sdk, fastmcp) are high-value supply chain targets — CVE-2025-6514 (CVSS 9.6) in mcp-remote affected 437,000+ installs. Always pin exact versions (no ^ or ~ ranges). Use lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, uv.lock). Never run `npx mcp-remote` without version pinning. Verify package integrity with `npm audit` or `pip-audit` before deployment. Reference: CVE-2025-6514, OWASP ASI04.
highN3JSON-RPC Request ID CollisionMCP07-insecure-configAML.T0054
Pattern "(?:requestId|request_id|id)\s*[:=]\s*(?:Math\.random|Math\.floor\(Math\.random)" matched in source_code: "Id = Math.random" (at position 4069)
Use cryptographically random or UUID-based request IDs to prevent collision attacks. Do not use sequential integers — an attacker can predict the next ID and inject a response before the legitimate server responds (response spoofing). Validate that response IDs match pending request IDs. Reference: JSON-RPC 2.0 Section 4.1 — 'id' must be unique within a session.
highQ14Concurrent MCP Server Race ConditionMCP07-insecure-configT1068
Pattern "(?:read|write|modify|delete).*(?:file|path|directory)(?!.*(?:lock|mutex|semaphore|flock|atomic))" matched in source_code: "ReadStream(filePath" (at position 5102)
MCP servers sharing filesystem or database backends with other servers must implement proper concurrency controls. Use: (1) file locking (flock/lockfile) for filesystem operations, (2) database transactions for all read-modify-write sequences, (3) atomic file operations (O_EXCL, mkdtemp) instead of check-then-create, (4) lstat() to detect symlinks before following (CVE-2025-53109). Never assume exclusive access to shared resources — other MCP servers may be operating concurrently.
highK1Absent Structured LoggingMCP09-logging-monitoringAML.T0054
Pattern "console\.(log|warn|error)\s*\(.*(?:tool|request|handler|execute|invoke)" matched in source_code: "console.error('Error handling request" (at position 8239)
Implement structured logging (pino, winston, or equivalent) for all tool call handlers. Every tool invocation should log: timestamp, tool name, caller identity, parameters (sanitized), result status, and duration. Required by ISO 27001 A.8.15, CoSAI MCP-T12, and NIST AI RMF MEASURE 2.6.
highK16Unbounded Recursion / Missing Depth LimitsMCP07-insecure-configAML.T0054
Pattern "(invoke|call|execute)[_\s-]?(?:tool|agent|self)(?!.*(?:depth|level|limit|max[_\s-]?(?:depth|recursi|iter|call)|count))" matched in source_code: "callTool" (at position 9167)
Add explicit depth/recursion limits to all recursive operations. Use iterative approaches where possible. Set maximum depth for directory walking (max_depth=10), tree traversal (max_level=20), and agent re-invocation (max_calls=5). Implement circuit breakers that halt after N iterations. Required by EU AI Act Art. 15 (robustness) and OWASP ASI08.
highO6Server Fingerprinting via Error ResponsesMCP04-data-exfiltrationAML.T0057
Pattern "(?:diagnostics?|debug|system_?info|server_?info|health_?detailed|status_?detail)\s*[:=]\s*\{[^}]*(?:version|os|arch|platform|uptime|memory|cpu|disk|hostname|pid)" matched in source_code: "serverInfo: {
name: "mcp-communicator-telegram",
version" (at position 8958)
Never expose process, OS, runtime, or database metadata in tool responses or error messages. Use generic error messages ("An error occurred") for production responses. Remove or disable debug/diagnostic endpoints. If health endpoints are needed, limit them to simple "ok"/"error" status without infrastructure details. Wrap all error handlers with a sanitization layer that strips system information.
highN1JSON-RPC Batch Request AbuseMCP07-insecure-configAML.T0054
Pattern "for\s*\(\s*(?:const|let|var)\s+\w+\s+of\s+(?:batch|requests|messages)\s*\)(?!.*(?:break|length\s*>|slice\(0))" matched in source_code: "for (const message of messages)" (at position 8085)
Enforce a maximum batch size for JSON-RPC requests (recommended: 20-25 requests per batch). Reject batches exceeding the limit with a -32600 (Invalid Request) error. Implement per-batch timeout and memory limits. Reference: JSON-RPC 2.0 Section 6 (Batch) does not mandate limits — servers MUST enforce them.
mediumK17Missing Timeout or Circuit BreakerMCP07-insecure-configAML.T0054
Pattern "(?:fetch|axios|got|request|urllib|httpx|http\.get|http\.post)\s*\((?!.*(?:timeout|signal|AbortSignal|deadline|cancel))" matched in source_code: "Request(" (at position 8195)
Add timeouts to ALL external calls: HTTP requests (30s), database queries (10s), subprocess execution (60s), and MCP tool calls (30s). Implement circuit breakers that open after N consecutive failures (e.g., opossum, cockatiel). Use AbortSignal for cancellable operations. Required by EU AI Act Art. 15 and OWASP ASI08.
mediumC6Error LeakageMCP09-logging-monitoring
Pattern "catch\s*\([^)]*\)\s*\{[^}]*(?:throw|return).*(?:err|error)\.(?:message|stack)" matched in source_code: "catch (error: any) {
console.error('Error in notifyUser:', error);
throw new Error(`Failed to send notification: ${error.message" (at position 3746)
Return generic error messages to clients. Log detailed errors server-side. Never expose stack traces, file paths, or internal error details in responses.
lowF4MCP Spec Non-ComplianceMCP07-insecure-config
Server fails MCP spec compliance checks: required:server_name; required:server_version; required:protocol_version; recommended:tool_descriptions; recommended:parameter_descriptions
Follow the MCP specification for server metadata. Include server name, version, and protocol version. Provide descriptions for all tools and parameters.
Tools
No tools exposed by this server.
Security Category Deep Dive
Sub-Category Tree · Remediation Roadmap · Attack Stories · Compliance Overlay · ATLAS Techniques · Maturity Model
Prompt Injection
Prompt & context manipulation attacks
69
Maturity
14
Rules
5
Sub-Categories
1
Gaps
64%
Implemented
56
Tests
1
Stories
100%3 rules
Injection via tool descriptions and parameter fields
GAP-001Prompt Injection Coverage GapMissing detection coverage for emerging prompt injection attack variants not addressed by current rules
100%4 rules
Hidden instructions via external content and tool responses
100%2 rules
Context window saturation and prior-approval exploitation
100%3 rules
Payload hiding via invisible chars, base64, schema fields
100%2 rules
Injection via prompt templates and runtime tool output