Threadline
Agent-to-agent messaging relay with zero-config discovery, message routing, and reply handling.
0Tools
12Findings
8Stars
—Downloads
Mar 22, 2026Last Scanned
Findings12
5critical
6high
0medium
1low
0informational
criticalJ1Cross-Agent Configuration PoisoningMCP05-privilege-escalationAML.T0054
Pattern "(\.claude[/\\]|claude[/\\]settings|claude.*config)" matched in source_code: "ClaudePath, detectProjectDir, ensureStateDir, resolveAgentDir, standaloneAgentsDir } from './core/Config" (at position 4082)
MCP servers MUST NOT write to AI agent configuration directories. If configuration management is the server's purpose, require explicit user confirmation before any write and restrict paths to the server's own config namespace. CVE-2025-53773 demonstrated this enables full RCE across agent boundaries.
criticalQ13MCP Bridge Package Supply Chain AttackMCP10-supply-chainAML.T0054
Pattern "["']@modelcontextprotocol/sdk["']\s*:\s*["'](?:\^|~|\*|latest)" matched in source_code: ""@modelcontextprotocol/sdk": "^" (at position 30909)
MCP bridge packages (mcp-remote, mcp-proxy, @modelcontextprotocol/sdk, fastmcp) are high-value supply chain targets — CVE-2025-6514 (CVSS 9.6) in mcp-remote affected 437,000+ installs. Always pin exact versions (no ^ or ~ ranges). Use lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, uv.lock). Never run `npx mcp-remote` without version pinning. Verify package integrity with `npm audit` or `pip-audit` before deployment. Reference: CVE-2025-6514, OWASP ASI04.
criticalK8Cross-Boundary Credential SharingMCP05-privilege-escalationAML.T0054
Pattern "(return|respond|output|result).*(?:token|credential|api[_\s-]?key|secret|password|bearer)" matched in source_code: "Result as SecretMigrationResult } from './core/Secret" (at position 7467)
Never forward, share, or embed credentials across trust boundaries. Use OAuth token exchange (RFC 8693) to create scoped, delegated tokens instead of passing original credentials. Never include credentials in tool responses. Required by ISO 27001 A.5.17 and OWASP ASI03.
criticalK9Dangerous Post-Install HooksMCP10-supply-chainAML.T0054
Pattern "["'](?:postinstall|preinstall|install)["']\s*:\s*["'][^"']*(?:curl|wget|node\s|python|bash|sh\s|powershell)" matched in source_code: ""postinstall": "node " (at position 29897)
Remove network requests, code execution, and shell commands from install hooks. Post-install scripts should only run build/compile steps (node-gyp, tsc). Use --ignore-scripts flag during CI installations and audit all install hooks before allowing. Required by OWASP ASI04 and CoSAI MCP-T11.
criticalQ11Code Suggestion Poisoning via MCPMCP01-prompt-injectionAML.T0054.001
Pattern "(?:suggest|generate|complete|insert).*(?:code|function|class|import|require)" matched in source_code: "generatePairingCode" (at position 5042)
MCP tool outputs flowing into IDE code suggestion contexts must be sanitized. Implement output content policies that: (1) strip hidden Unicode characters (zero-width, RTL override, tag characters), (2) detect embedded instructions targeting AI code assistants, (3) validate code blocks against security patterns before they enter the suggestion pipeline, (4) never include shell commands in tool outputs without explicit [COMMAND] markers visible to the user. Reference: IDEsaster (Dec 2025), arXiv 2509.22040.
highQ15A2A/MCP Protocol Boundary ConfusionMCP06-excessive-permissionsAML.T0054
Pattern "(?:discover|register|advertise).*(?:agent|skill|capability)(?!.*(?:verify|auth|sign|trust))" matched in source_code: "registerAgent" (at position 4424)
Servers bridging A2A and MCP protocols must: (1) sanitize all A2A task metadata before passing to MCP tool inputs, (2) apply MCP content policies to A2A TextPart/FilePart/DataPart content, (3) validate A2A push notifications before they re-enter MCP context, (4) require cryptographic verification for agent discovery and registration (prevent fake agent advertisement — arXiv 2602.19555), (5) maintain separate permission models for A2A and MCP operations — trust in one protocol must not automatically grant trust in the other.
highD1Known CVEs in DependenciesMCP08-dependency-vuln
Dependency "vitest@2.0.0" has known CVEs:
Update dependencies to versions that patch known CVEs. Run 'npm audit fix' or 'pip-audit' to identify and resolve vulnerable dependencies.
highK15Multi-Agent Collusion PreconditionsMCP05-privilege-escalationAML.T0054
Pattern "(agent|delegate).*(?:send|receive|message|communicate)(?!.*(?:log|audit|trace|record|monitor))" matched in source_code: "AgentMessage" (at position 12859)
Implement collusion-resistant multi-agent architecture: (1) Verify agent identity cryptographically before accepting commands, (2) Apply ACLs to shared write surfaces, (3) Rate-limit cross-agent invocations, (4) Audit all inter-agent communication with timestamps and agent IDs, (5) Baseline normal interaction patterns for anomaly detection. Required by MAESTRO L7 and CoSAI MCP-T9.
highK18Cross-Trust-Boundary Data Flow in Tool ResponseMCP04-data-exfiltrationAML.T0054
Pattern "(?:webhook|http|fetch|axios|post|send|email).*(?:readFile|read_file|query|select|getSecret|credential|password)" matched in source_code: "Email } from './monitoring/Credential" (at position 16948)
Implement data flow taint tracking: tag data from sensitive sources (databases, credentials, files) and prevent it from flowing to external sinks (HTTP, webhooks, email) without explicit sanitization/redaction. Apply data classification and enforce boundary controls per trust level. Required by ISO 27001 A.5.14 and CoSAI MCP-T5.
highK4Missing Human Confirmation for Destructive OpsMCP06-excessive-permissionsAML.T0054
Pattern "(force|no[_\s-]?confirm|yes[_\s-]?all|assume[_\s-]?yes).*(?:delete|remove|drop|overwrite)" matched in source_code: "forceRemove" (at position 4628)
All destructive operations (delete, drop, overwrite, send) MUST include a human confirmation step. Use the MCP destructiveHint annotation to signal that client-side confirmation is required. Implement an approval gate pattern: preview changes → request confirmation → execute. Required by ISO 42001 A.9.1, EU AI Act Art. 14, and NIST AI RMF GOVERN 1.7.
highD1Known CVEs in DependenciesMCP08-dependency-vuln
Dependency "express@4.18.0" has known CVEs:
Update dependencies to versions that patch known CVEs. Run 'npm audit fix' or 'pip-audit' to identify and resolve vulnerable dependencies.
lowF4MCP Spec Non-ComplianceMCP07-insecure-config
Server fails MCP spec compliance checks: required:server_name; required:server_version; required:protocol_version; recommended:tool_descriptions; recommended:parameter_descriptions
Follow the MCP specification for server metadata. Include server name, version, and protocol version. Provide descriptions for all tools and parameters.
Tools
No tools exposed by this server.
Security Category Deep Dive
Sub-Category Tree · Remediation Roadmap · Attack Stories · Compliance Overlay · ATLAS Techniques · Maturity Model
Prompt Injection
Prompt & context manipulation attacks
69
Maturity
14
Rules
5
Sub-Categories
1
Gaps
64%
Implemented
56
Tests
1
Stories
100%3 rules
Injection via tool descriptions and parameter fields
GAP-001Prompt Injection Coverage GapMissing detection coverage for emerging prompt injection attack variants not addressed by current rules
100%4 rules
Hidden instructions via external content and tool responses
100%2 rules
Context window saturation and prior-approval exploitation
100%3 rules
Payload hiding via invisible chars, base64, schema fields
100%2 rules
Injection via prompt templates and runtime tool output