trigger.dev
Trigger.dev – build and deploy fully‑managed AI agents and workflows
0Tools
2Findings
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Mar 19, 2026Last Scanned
Findings2
1critical
0high
0medium
1low
0informational
criticalK5Auto-Approve / Bypass Confirmation PatternMCP06-excessive-permissionsAML.T0054
Pattern "\-\-(yes|force|no-confirm|no-prompt|assume-yes)\b" matched in source_code: "--force" (at position 260)
Never auto-approve or bypass human confirmation for operations with side effects. Implement explicit confirmation gates that cannot be programmatically bypassed. If batch/CI mode is needed, require an explicit opt-in flag with audit logging. Required by EU AI Act Art. 14 (human oversight) and OWASP ASI09.
lowF4MCP Spec Non-ComplianceMCP07-insecure-config
Server fails MCP spec compliance checks: required:server_name; required:server_version; required:protocol_version; recommended:tool_descriptions; recommended:parameter_descriptions
Follow the MCP specification for server metadata. Include server name, version, and protocol version. Provide descriptions for all tools and parameters.
Tools
No tools exposed by this server.
Security Category Deep Dive
Sub-Category Tree · Remediation Roadmap · Attack Stories · Compliance Overlay · ATLAS Techniques · Maturity Model
Prompt Injection
Prompt & context manipulation attacks
69
Maturity
14
Rules
5
Sub-Categories
1
Gaps
64%
Implemented
56
Tests
1
Stories
100%3 rules
Injection via tool descriptions and parameter fields
GAP-001Prompt Injection Coverage GapMissing detection coverage for emerging prompt injection attack variants not addressed by current rules
100%4 rules
Hidden instructions via external content and tool responses
100%2 rules
Context window saturation and prior-approval exploitation
100%3 rules
Payload hiding via invisible chars, base64, schema fields
100%2 rules
Injection via prompt templates and runtime tool output